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Consumer Protection: The Effect Of The
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act
In recent years legislatures and courts throughout the coun-
try have manifested a growing concern for protection of consumer
interests. California has been in the forefront of this growing con-
cern. Until 1971 California consumers found protection in the
warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and in the ex-
panding doctrine of strict liability in tort for defective products. In
1970 the California Legislature passed the Song-Beverly Con-
sumer Warranty Act which became effective in March of 1971.
In 1971 the Legislature enacted amendments to this act which be-
came effective in March 1972. This comment summarizes the na-
ture and scope of the remedies available to California consumers
under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, and compares the
Act with the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
and the doctrine of strict liability in tort. The author concludes
that, although there is much remaining to be accomplished in the
area of consumer warranty protection, the Song-Beverly Act as
amended in 1972 is a significant step forward in providing ade-
quate protection to California consumers.
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production: and
the interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as
it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The
maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to
attempt to prove it.1
Consumer interests have long been a governmental concern.2 The
President's Commission on Civil Disorders in 1968 disclosed that unfair
consumer sales and trade practices were one of the twelve major sources
of discontent in urban ghettos.3 Beyond the problem of urban
ghettos, however, it has been estimated that about 20 percent of the
national output of goods are sold by means of misrepresentation or at
1. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NAtnU AN CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1937).
2. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES
(1970).
3. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 143-
145 (1968).
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an inflated price.4 Furthermore, recent California products liability
litigation indicates that the California consumer has been sold many
dangerous and defective products. He has found ground glass in his
food,5 maggots and worms in his sandwich,6 exploding beer and coke
bottles,7 broken milk bottles,8 collapsing cartons,9 grinding wheels
that blow up'0 or shatter in his face,1" airplanes that cannot safely be
flown and automobiles that cannot safely be driven.1"
In spite of these problems California has been a leader in the con-
sumer protection field. In the midst of what has been called a con-
sumer revolution,14 the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act5 (Song-
Beverly Act) was passed by the California Legislature. 6 The Song-
Beverly Act generally complements the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, as enacted in California, but where there is a con-
flict, the provisions of the Song-Beverly Act prevail. 7
The provisions of the Act protect purchasers of consumer goods.
Goods are defined to include any new mobile home, motor vehicle,
appliance or the like which is primarily for personal, family or house-
hold use. The definition of goods also includes personal, family or
household goods if the retail sale of such goods is accompanied by an ex-
press warranty, but excludes soft goods and consumables meaning cloth-
ing, food, drugs, cosmetics, or like products.' 8 This definition is se-
verely limited in comparison with the broad coverage of goods under the
California Commercial Code.' 9
4. CoUNciL OF STATE GOvERNMENTS, supra note 2, at 3.
5. Goetten v. Owl Drug Co., 6 Cal. 2d 683, 59 P.2d 142 (1936).
6. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
7. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944);
Jones v. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311
(1961).
8. Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1963).
9. Faucette v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 196, 33 Cal. Rptr. 215
(1963).
10. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr.
863 (1960).
11. McCarter v. Norton Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 69 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1968).
12. Lindberg v. Croutches, 167 Cal. App. 2d 828, 334 P.2d 701 (1959).
13. Budrow v. Wheatcraft, 115 Cal. App. 2d 517, 252 P.2d 637 (1953). (locking
brakes). This does not seem to be an uncommon problem. "Regardless of which
American car you buy, chances are the brakes are either defective or dangerously
inadequate under expected conditions of highway use, even when the car is brand-
new." NADER, DODGE, HOTCHEISS, WHAT TO DO WITH YOUR BAD CAR; AN ACTION
MANUAL FOR LEMON OWNERS (1971).
14. See Comment, Consumer Protection and Warranties of Quality, A Proposalfor a Statutory Warranty in Sales to Consumers, 34 ALBANY L. Rlv. 339 (1970).
15. CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1333 at 2478.
16. The Song-Beverly Act was enacted in 1970, and took effect in March 1971.
It was subsequently amended in 1971; the amendments taking effect in March 1972
(CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1523 at 3001).
17. CAL. Crv. CODE §1790.3.
18. CAL. Clv. CODE §1791.
19. CAL. CoMm. CODE §2105.
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To give full appreciation to the importance of the Song-Beverly Act
and to clarify the nature and scope of the remedies available to the Cali-
fornia consumer, the Act will be compared with the statutory law of war-
ranties and with the judicially developed law of strict liability in tort.
The Song-Beverly Act and Warranty Law
Traditionally, the most common form of redress for injury caused
by a defective product was an action for breach of warranty.20 Such
an action had attributes of both contract and tort. 1 Early warranty
cases were in the nature of a tort action for deceit, but there was no
requirement of scienter or awareness of the falsity of the representa-
tions by the seller.22 Modernly, a warranty is generally considered as
either express or implied and is viewed as an element of the contract
under which a product is sold.2 3 The warranty obligation, or quality
term, as it is sometimes called, is one of the most important provisions
in a sales contract, and it has been estimated that as much as one third
of all sales litigation has been concerned with it.24
A. The Express Warranty
An express warranty is made as a part of a bargain by acts or agree-
ments of the parties; it does not arise by operation of law. 25  Com-
mon law caveat emptor encompassed a rule that the seller had no
20. See Comment, The Contractual Aspect of Consumer Protection: Recent De-
velopments in the Law of Sales Warranties, 64 Mica. L REv. 1430 (1966).
21. See Note, Warranty: Tort and Contract Characterization: Statutes of Limita-
tions, 43 CALIF. L. Rnv. 546, 549 (1955).
22. W. SEDGWICK, S. CONLEY & R. SLEIGHT, PRODUCTS LiABYmrry IMPLIED WAR-
RANIES (1964). The tort action was an action on the case; the wrong was a form of
misrepresentation which was not clearly distinguished from deceit. Assumpsit, from
which the modem law of contract has grown, developed in the 15th century, at least
partially based on the earlier warranty actions. It also was originally an action of
trespass on the case. In 1778, the case of Stuart v. Wilkins became the first case to
apply the contract theory to what had traditionally been an action in tort. Prosser,
The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 118 (1943);
O.W. HOLMES, TAE CoMMON LAW 215, 216-224 (Howe ed. 1963); Stuart v. Wilkins, 1
Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1126-27 (1960); Williston, Liability for
Honest Misrepresentations, 24 HAnv. L. REv. 415, 420 (1911).
23. Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 890, 989 (1969). Comment, The Contractual Aspect of Consumer Protection:
Recent Developments in the Law of Sales Warranties, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1430 (1966).
24. W. HAwKvn.AN, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE U.C.C., Vol. I at 57 (1964).
Professor Vold delineates the triple pronged nature of a warranty as:
Prong no. 1, the promissory warranty, is strictly contractual; prong no. 2,
the warranty obligation is based on the seller's representations, including the
deal, and is independently imposed by law, comparable to tort obligations;
prong no. 3 is also independently imposed by law, apart from the seller's
representations, for strictly public policy reasons.
M. VOLD, LAW OF SALES 1127 (2d ed. 1959).
25. Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law
of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 281, 284 (1961).
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responsibility for the quality of the goods sold unless he expressly guar-
anteed them.26 Some courts required the use of words of art such as
"I warrant" or "I guarantee" to show the seller's specific intent to cre-
ate a warranty. 27  Inroads were made in the first quarter of the
Twentieth Century, when courts ruled that no particular form of words
was necessary to constitute an express warranty, so long as the buyer
could reasonably have understood from the transaction that what was
said was affirming essential qualities of the product. If the buyer re-
lied on the affirmation in good faith, an express warranty was created.28
In 1965 the Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter U.C.C.) went into
effect in California.29 Express warranties are defined in the California
Commercial Code (California's version of the U.C.C.) at Section
2313.0 It specifies that an express warranty is created by: (1) an
affirmation of fact or promise relating to the goods; (2) a descrip-
tion of the goods; or (3) a sample or model.8 1 The facts creating the
warranty must be a part of the basis of the bargain before an express
warranty will arise.3 There is a problem, however, in that neither the
U.C.C. nor the California Commercial Code defines the term "basis of
the bargain."33  The U.C.C. does, however, give some aid to interpre-
tation of "basis of the bargain" in the comments accompanying it, which
indicate that all statements of the seller become part of the basis of
the bargain unless good reason is shown to the contrary.8 4  The factual
question of what constitutes the basis of the bargain depends on the
circumstances of the case. 5 Some statements by the seller may not
be taken as affirmations or promises which enter into the bargain be-
cause the seller is only "puffing" and no warranty is created at all.30
Where the line is to be drawn, however, between warranty and puffing is
not apparent.3 7
26. HAVKLAND, supra note 24, at 57.
27. Id.
28. Steinver v. Jarrett, 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 369, 872, 280 P.2d 235 (1954);
Cole v. Weber, 69 Cal. App. 394, 397, 231 P. 353 (1924).
29. CAL. COMm. CODE §1101 et seq. CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 819 at 1849. In 1931
California adopted the Uniform Sales Act but the adoption did not affect the prior
existing case law regarding express warranties, CAL. STATS. 1931 c. 1070 at 2234; see
Stott v. Johnston, 36 Cal. 2d 864, 869-870, 229 P.2d 348, 351 (1951).
30. This section is identical to the uniform version.
31. CAL. Comm. CODE §2313(1).
32. Id.
33. Prof. Hawkland suggests that any statement which reasonably induces the
buyer to act becomes a basis of the bargain. HAwKLAND, supra note 24 at 58.
34. See U.C.C. §2-313, Comments 3, 8. See also Comment, The Extension of
Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions, 10 Bos'r. COL. IND. & COM. L. REv. 127,
128 (1968). Clear affirmative proof must be presented by the seller in order to ob-
viate this presumption.
35. U.C.C. §2-313, Comment 3.
36. U.C.C. §2-313, Comment 8 and CAL. COMM. CODE §2313(2).
37. See, Comment, supra note 14, at 343.
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Under the Song-Beverly Act, an express warranty arising out of a
sale of consumer goods must be written,3" or if there is a sample
or model, the goods must conform to the sample or model."0 Under
the California Commercial Code, statements may be oral or written to
create an express warranty.40 Since conflicts are resolved in favor of
the Song-Beverly Act,41 the more strict rule applies in consumer sales.
The drafters of the Song-Beverly Act felt that more formality was
necessary in applying its additional remedies to an express warranty.42
In creating an express warranty by sample or model, the Song-Bev-
erly Act, unlike the California Commercial Code, does not require the
sample or model to be part of the basis of the bargain.43 However,
application of either provision would appear to produce the same re-
sult, except in rare instances. For example, a green four-slice toaster
sits on the shelf of the store with a number 56 on it. The consumer or-
ders a 56 toaster. When she takes it home and opens the box, she
finds a red four-slice toaster. The express warranty under the Song-
Beverly Act is breached by the fact that red is not green.44 Under
the California Commercial Code the same result would be reached
using the presumption that the sample as a whole, including color, was
intended to be part of the basis of the bargain. Absent some unmis-
takable denial, if the sample toaster had been drawn from stock on
hand, it must be regarded as describing values of the goods for which
the buyer had contracted.4" However, where a model of merchandise
is offered for inspection4 6 (e.g., where the toasters are being shipped
from the factory and are not in the store at the time of the making of
the contract), the mercantile presumption that the model has become a
literal description of the subject matter is not so strong. If the
seller could show that the model toaster was illustrative of four-slice
38. CAL. Civ. CODE §1791.2(a)(1).
39. CAL. CIv. CODE §1791.2(a)(2).
40. The Code refers to "any affirmation of fact or promise .... " CAL. COMM.
CODE §2313(1) (a).
41. CAL. Crv. CODE §1790.3.
42. Interview with Richard Thompson, Administrative Assistant to Senator Alfred
Song, in Sacrameufo, California, Jan. 25, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Thompson].
43. Compare CAL. Civ. CODE § 1791.2(a) (2) with CAL. COMM. CODE §2313.
44. The whole of the goods (the toaster) does not conform to the sample or
model. CAL. CIV. CODE §1791.2(a) (2).
45. See U.C.C. §2-313, Comment 6. Should the consumer have been color blind
and could not tell red from green, the color would not be a part of the basis of the
bargain, and no express warranty as to color would be created under the California
Commercial Code. There is still an express warranty as to color under the Song-
Beverly Act.
46. The Song-Beverly Act does not define sample or model. The California
Commercial Code makes the distinction that "sample" is something actually drawn
from the bulk of goods which is the subject matter of the sale, and "model" is that
which is offered for inspection when the subject matter is not at hand and which has
not been drawn from the bulk of the goods. See U.C.C. §2-313, Comment 6.
47. U.C.C. §2-313, Comment 6.
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toasters without regard to color, it could be held as a suggestion of the
character of the subject matter of the contract and not as the basis
of the bargain. As such, there would be no express warranty as to
color under the California Commercial Code. Under the Song-Beverly
Act there would still be an express warranty as to the color. As a re-
sult, it appears that the Song-Beverly Act extends the protection avail-
able to California consumers with respect to express warranties.
B. The Implied Warranty of Merchantability
Only express warranties were recognized at common law. Early in
the Nineteenth Century, however, as greater protection for the buyer
was desired, two distinct implied warranties of quality developed in
situations in which the buyer relied on the skill and judgment of the
seller-merchantability and fitness for purpose.48
As the concept of merchantability developed, 49 it came to mean
that goods must pass under the same description specified in the agree-
ment and be reasonably fit for the ordinary uses to which such goods
are put. Only persons generally handling goods of the kind in question
impliedly warrant merchantability. At common law, a dealer was not
liable unless he was also the manufacturer, no element of reliance
being present.50
The Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-314 (California Commer-
cial Code Section 2314) contains much of the law developed under
the common law and the Uniform Sales Act. It follows the Uniform
Sales Act's rationale that the seller should assume responsibility for
48. SEDGWICK, CONLEY & SLEIGHT, supra note 22, at 3.
49. The first significant case applying the warranty of merchantability was
Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815), Lord Ellenborough
set out the fundamental principle of merchantability in terms of saleability:
I am of the opinion, however, that under such circumstances, the purchaser
has a right to expect a saleable article answering the description in the con-
tract. Without any particular warranty, there is an implied term in every
such contract. Where there is no opportunity to inspect the commodity, the
maxim of caveat emptor does not apply. He cannot without a warranty insist
that it shall be of any particular quality or fineness, but the intention of both
parties must be taken to be, that it shall be saleable in the market under the
denomination mentioned in the contract between them. The purchaser cannot
be supposed to buy goods to lay them on a dunghill.
See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Hnv. L. REv. 457, 463-64 (1897); Prosser,
The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. Rav. 117, 120-21 (1943).
50. Sedgwick, supra note 22, at 4, See also Prosser, supra note 49, at 125 where
he states that a seller's obligation to deliver merchantable goods was at least that the
goods were:
(1) genuine according to the name and description,(2) saleable in the market under the designation,
(3) fit for the ordinary uses and purposes of such goods, and(4) free from defects interfering with the sale or ordinary use.
He adds quality and price, to mean a minimum standard of quality called for by a
merchantable article.
1973 / Consumer Warranties
defective products as a cost of doing business.51 The U.C.C. implies
the warranty of merchantability only "if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind."5  This means that if a person makes
an isolated sale, no warranty of merchantability would be implied.5 3
The Song-Beverly Act parallels this provision.54
To imply merchantability under the U.C.C. there must be a sale
of goods.55 California has long been in accord with the U.C.C. pro-
vision that treats the serving of food and drink as a sale of goods for
purposes of implying a warranty of merchantability. 5   However, the
conceptual problems in nonfood services versus goods situations still
remain and developing case law must be examined to determine if a
sale of services or goods has occurred. 57  Whether or not definitional
problems of what is, or is not, a sale of goods will occur under the
Song-Beverly Act remains to be seen.
The California Commercial Code sets forth minimum standards as
to what constitutes merchantability. Fungible goods must be of fair
average quality and pass without objection in the trade; nonfungible
goods must merely pass without objection in the trade with no mini-
mum quality standard delineated. 58  The term without objection is
not clearly defined. 59 The 1952 draft of the U.C.C. provided that the
51. Prosser, supra note 49, at 122.
52. CAL. CoM. CODE §2314(1). This is a smaller group than everyone engaged
in business and requires a professional status as to particular kinds of goods. CAL.
COMM. CODE §2104, See also U.C.C. §2-104, Comment 2.
53. CAL. CoMm. CODE §2314; see also U.C.C. §2-314, Comment 3.
For example, a radio salesman selling his own car is not a merchant with respect to
the car and no warranty of merchantability would arise with the sale.
54. CAL. Civ. CODE §1791.
55. Miller, A "Sale of Goods" As A Prerequisite For Warranty Protection, 24
Bus. LAw. 847, 848 (1969).
56. U.C.C. §2-214; Klein v. Duchess Sanwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799
(1939); Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936).
57. See, e.g., Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792
(1954); See also Comment, Sales: Implied Warranty-Furnishing of Blood By a Hos-
pital For A Hospital For A Transfusion, 7 HAST. L.J. 217 (1956); But see CAL.
HrALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1623.
58. CAL. COMM. CODE §2314(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such
as:
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adquately contained, packaged and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.
See also U.C.C. §2-314, Comment 7.
59. See U.C.C. §2-314, Comment 7, stating that a fair percentage of the least or
worst is permissible but the goods are not "fair average" if they are all of the least
or worst quality under the description. For example, for 100 widgets to be of "fair
average" they cannot all be widget, grade worst. However, "fair average" may be 40
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fair average standard should apply to all merchantable goods, but in
subsequent drafts the fair average standard was limited to fungible goods
because of pressures from certain mercantile interests."0
The requirement that the goods be fit for ordinary purposes for
which goods of that type are used is a fundamental concept of mer-
chantability."' There is a question, however, as to the merchant-
ability of goods which have a defect that is deemed natural to that type
of product. A Pennsylvania case allowed recovery for a chicken bone
found in a chicken pie;"2 a Massachusetts case denied recovery for a
fish bone found in New England fish chowder;"' and finding a cherry
pit in a cherry pie was a "reasonable expectation" in Oregon. 4 The
ultimate criteria in these cases appears to be that the item must pass
without objection in the trade under the contract description (with the
knowledge of the potential defect).65
Another element of the implied warranty of merchantability, at least
under the California Commercial Code, is that goods must conform to
promises or affirmations on the label or container. 6 However, affirma-
tions on the label are express warranties if they are part of the basis of
the bargain, 7 whether read before or after the time of purchase., s The
result of this is that one appears to have a problem in determining who
is liable on what theory (express or implied warranty) when the goods
do not conform to the label. This becomes significant in questions of
disclaimer, since express warranties are more difficult to disclaim than
implied warranties. The most reasonable construction seems to be that
if the buyer did read the label, or other circumstances show that the
affirmations on the label became a part of the basis of the bargain
widgets, grade worst, and 60 widgets, grade slightly better than worst. The standard
for passing without objection in the trade would seem to depend on how loudly buyer's
screamed when sellers tendered 100 widgets, grade worst.60. Ezer, supra note 25, at 293. However, as the Code broadly defines fungibles
under §1201(17), courts could interpret the "pass without objection" standard rea-
sonably close to "fair average." Id. at 294.
61. CAL. COMM. CODE §2314(2) (c); See also U.C.C. §2-314, Comment 8.
62. DeGraff v. Myers Foods, Inc., 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 19, 8 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 364(C.P. 1958).
63. Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d 309 (1964).
The court suggests that the risk is well taken when one eats the glorious New England
fish chowder.
64. Hunt v. Ferguson-Paulus Enterprises, 82 Or. Adv. Sh. 785, 415 P.2d 13(1966).
65. CAL. COMM. CODE §2314(2)(a). See Bailey, Sales Warranties, Products
Liability and the U.C.C.) A Lab Analysis of the Cases, 4 WILLAmETrE L.J. 291, 301(1967) forfurther discussion of "natural defects."
66. CAL. COMM. CODE §2314(2)(f).67. CAL. COMM. CODE §2313(1)(a), (b); see also U.C.C. §2-313, Comment 3.
68. CAL. COMM. CODE §2313; see also U.C.C. §2-313, Comment 7. The express
warranty on the label modifies the contract; no consideration is necessary. CAL. COMM.
CODE §2209(1). A written modification satisfies the requirement of CAL. Civ.
CODE §1698, carried forward into CAL. Comm. CODE §2209 (2).
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between the seller and the buyer, then the seller is liable on an express
warranty theory, whether he actually put the label on the product
or not. The actual labeler would also be liable on the same theory. If
the buyer did not read the label, or other circumstances show that the
label was not a part of the basis of the bargain, then no express
warranty results under the California Commercial Code, either on the
part of the labeler, or the nonlabeler seller. The remedy would be for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.6 9
Under the Song-Beverly Act the confusion as to whether promises or
affirmations of fact on the container or label are express or implied war-
ranties is avoided. Nevertheless the consumer appears not to be as
well off under the Song-Beverly Act as he is under the California Com-
mercial Code. This results from the narrow definition of express war-
ranty under the Song-Beverly Act. That is, unless the statements on
the label deal with preserving or maintaining the utility or perform-
ance of the good, or providing compensation when there is a failure
in utility or performance, there would only be an implied warranty
that the goods would conform to the statements on the label or con-
tainer.70
The minimum standard for merchantability under the Song-Beverly
Act substantially follows the Commercial Code.71  The Song-Bev-
69. One author suggests that this provision is geared toward making the non-
labeler seller of the goods responsible on an implied warranty theory; the actual
labeler's liability rests on express warranty. This puts a minimum responsibility on
the seller whether or not he adopts the statements on the label as his own express
warranties. See Cosway, Sales-A Comparison of the Law In Washington and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 35 WASH. L. REv. 617, 623 (1960). The Code, however,
does not distinguish between the labeler and nonlabeler, and suggests that if a label is
put on the goods, there is an implied warranty. CAL. CoMm. CODE §2314, see also
U.C.C. §2-314 Comment 10. The New York Law Revision Commission suggests that
the section should be interpreted as a supplement to the general rule that any
"affirmation of fact or promise [which] becomes part of the basis of the bargain"
creates an express warranty. If the buyer read the label before purchasing, it is
part of the basis of the bargain. If he bought without reading and later learned that
the goods were not as represented, they would be unmerchantable under §2-314(2) (f).
1 NEw YoaK LAw RuviEw COMM. STUDY OF THE U.C.C., 399 (1955). Cited with
approval in CONTanUiNG EDUCATION OF THE BAR, California Commercial Law, §6.68
(1966).
70. CAL. Crv. CODE §§1791.1(a)(4), 1791.2.
71. CAL. Crv. CODE §1791.1(a) "Implied warranty of merchantability" or "im-
plied warranty that the goods are merchantable" means that the consumer goods meet
each of the following:(1) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description.
(2) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.
(3) Are adequately contained, packaged and labeled.
(4) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label.
Fungible consumer goods are subject to the same standards as other consumer goods.
Recall that under the U.C.C. fungible goods are subject to what semantically, at least,
appears to be a higher standard of merchantability. (See note 58, supra). It should
be noted that under the Song-Beverly Act the warranty of merchantability is assertable
against manufacturers only. (CAL. Crv. CODE §1792). This appears to be an exten-
sion of the protection afforded under California Commercial Code Section 2314 which
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erly Act originally provided that goods be free from defects in materials
or workmanship. The 1971 amendment to the Act, however, removed
this requirement. 2  For consumers, this appears undesirable in that it
returns the implied warranty to the Commercial Code's standard of
no objection in the trade rather than free from defects in materials and
workmanship.78
Consumers may derive additional benefit, however, from the Song-
Beverly Act's requirement that goods need to be adequately contained,
packaged and labeled before the warranty of merchantability is satis-
fled. The Commercial Code standard of merchantability requires
goods to be adequately contained, packaged and labeled as an agree-
ment may require, and applies only where the nature of the goods or
the transaction requires a certain type of container, package or label.
The Song-Beverly Act's standard appears to be a codification of broad
protections afforded the consumer by earlier case law17 that the adop-
tion of the Commercial Code seemed to have narrowed.
C. The Implied Warranty of Fitness For a Particular Purpose
The implied warranty of fitness for the buyer's particular purpose is
distinct from the warranty of merchantability, although the two often
overlap. The early English case of Gray v. Cox held that "if a person
sold a commodity for a particular purpose, he must be understood to
warrant it reasonably fit and proper for such purpose.17 7
The particular purpose doctrine was originally applied to a special
purpose as opposed to a general purpose. For greater consumer pro-
tection, the doctrine developed to mean the purpose for which a given
buyer intended to use the goods, although this purpose in some cases may
be merely the ordinary uses to which such goods are customarily put.71
However, goods may be merchantable and still be unfit for the partic-
ular purpose. For example, if a buyer informed the seller that he
wanted a toothbrush to clean his typewriter, and relied on the seller's
judgment, the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
could arise. The toothbrush would be merchantable if it cleaned
establishes the warranty of merchantability against a merchant seller in a given sales
transaction (who is not the manufacturer in most retail sales situations).
72. CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1523 at 3001.
73. Thornton, The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act: New Commandmentsfor Manufacturers, 46 L.A. BAn. BULL. 331, 332 (1971).
74. CAL. Crv. CODE §1791.1(a)(3).
75. CAL. CIV. CODE §2314(2) (e); See also U.C.C. §2-314, Comment 10.
76. E.g., Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814
(1963), Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr.
823 (1961).
77. Gray v. Cox, 107 Eng. Rep. 999 (Y-B. 1825).
78. SF.DowicK, CONLEY & SLEIGHT, supra note 22, at 7.
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teeth without cleaning the typewriter, but it would not be fit for the
particular purpose if it would not clean the typewriter. If the toothbrush
were purchased to clean teeth with that purpose known to the seller
and with the buyer relying on the seller's judgment, the warranties
would coexist and mean the same thing.
Under the California Commercial Code, the warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose arises when the seller is aware of the buyer's pur-
pose and is aware that the buyer is relying on the seller's judgment to
furnish suitable goods.79 The buyer does not have to actually notify
the seller of his purpose so long as the seller realizes what the purpose
is and realizes that the buyer is relying on the seller's judgment.80
Under the Song-Beverly Act, the implied warranty of fitness is vir-
tually identical to that of the California Commercial Code.81
The Application of Warranty Law
A. Duration
Generally, when no specific duration for a warranty is expressed,
the warranty is breached or not breached at the time of sale.82 That
is, the goods when sold either satisfy, or fail to satisfy, the warranty. If
the warranty is prospective and relates to a future event, it is not
breached until the happening of that event.8"
The Song-Beverly Act as originally enacted failed to place a dura-
tion on implied warranties. 4  The Act as amended, however, places
a duration of 60 days minimum and one year maximum on the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness, if there is an express war-
ranty accompanying the implied warranty. When there is a stated
duration for the express warranty which falls between 60 days and
one year, if reasonable, the implied warranty would have the same dur-
ation. When no duration for the express warranty is stated, the dura-
tion for the implied warranty is one year. If no express warranty is
79. CAr.. Comm. CoDE §2315.
80. CAL. COMM. CODE §2315; U.C.C. §2-315, Comment 1.
81. CAr.. Civ. CODE §1791.1(b).
82. In 1967 California adopted the U.C.C.'s section on statute of limitations in
contracts for the sale of goods. It established a uniform period of four years for
commencing action for breach of an oral or written contract. No specific statute of
limitations is specified by the California COmmercial Code for breach of implied
warranties. CAL. CoMM. CODE §2725, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1967 c. 799 at 2207; CAL.
CODE CIV. PROC. §339.
83. Thornton, supra note 73, at 335. See also, Aced v. Hobbs Seasack Plumbing
CO., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1961); Howe v. Pioneer Mfg.
Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 330, 68 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1968); Riesen v. Leeder, 193 Cal. App.
2d 580, 14 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1961). The California Commercial Code follows prior
California law in determining when a warranty is breached when there is no duration
placed on it. Thornton, supra note 73, at 335.
84. Thornton, supra note 73, at 334.
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given, there is no duration placed on the implied warranties.85 This
follows the general philosophy of the drafters of the Song-Beverly
Act that greater responsibility should be placed on the manufacturer,
retailer or distributor when he gives the consumer a written express
warranty, as opposed to when he does nothing and lets the consumer
rely only on the implied warranties which arise.86
B. Privity
The doctrine of privity is an important concept in determining the
scope of the protection afforded injured consumers by warranties.
The general rule of privity is that a contractual warranty extends only
to parties to the contract.8 7  As early as 1842, the English Court of
Exchequer held:
Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the par-
ties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous conse-
quences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue.88
By 1924, however, American courts had begun to liberalize this strict
approach.8 9
The first series of cases to eliminate the strict requirement of privity
of contract in warranty cases was the food cases. 90 In 1939 Cali-
fornia allowed recovery by an ultimate consumer not in privity with
the seller, and negated the effect of the language of the Uniform
85. CAL. Civ. CODE §1791.1(c).
86. Thompson, supra note 42, Sept. 30, 1971.
87. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 695, 268 P.2d 1041, 1048
(1954).
88. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). The concept in
Winterbottom, that a contracting party was liable only to those with whom he was
in privity led to the doctrine that sellers of defective goods were liable only to their
immediate buyers, even when the defect was the result of the retailer's or manufac-
turer's negligence. See Cohen, Fault and the Automobile Accident: The Loss Issue in
California, 12 U.C.LA. L. Rv. 164, 171 (1964). The duty of care owed to the
consumer was so restricted that the court said that "it is, no doubt, a hardship upon the
plaintiff to be without a remedy, but by that consideration we ought not to be influ-
enced." Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842). See also,
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN.
L. REv. 363 (1965).
89. Justice Cardozo wrote:
We in the United States have been readier to subordinate logic to utility,
so that the remedies of third parties, beneficiaries of a contract, at first
grudgingly allowed, are now multiplying and expanding. The development
is merely a phase of the assault, now extending along the entire line, upon
the ancient citadel of privity.
B. CA Dozo, TiE GROWTH OF THE LAW 77 (1924). The statement that is perhaps
the most widely quoted was made by Justice Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
225 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931), "the assault upon the citadel of privity
is proceeding in these days apace." See also MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
90. "The emotional drive and appeal of the cases centers in the stomach."
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J 1099, 1138 (1960).
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Sales Act which limited warranties to buyer and seller. 9  Other ex-
ceptions to the requirement of privity developed as courts invented in-
genious but unconvincing theories of fictitious agency, third-party bene-
ficiary contract, and other principles to get around the doctrine of priv-
ity.03
In the field of products liability Prosser dates the "fall of the citadel
of privity" as May 9, 1960, when the Supreme Court of New Jersey
decided the case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc." In that
case it was held that a strict approach to privity of contract would not
be allowed to bar a consumer from having an action against a man-
ufacturer for breach of a warranty of merchantability. 94
California at the time of Henningsen was still trying to find excep-
tions to privity by use of the sales warranty, and interpreted the term
so as to find an employee of the buyer in privity with the seller, as
part of the buyer's economic "family," severely stretching the concept
of privity. 5 The question of how far the courts were going to go in
expanding this concept was answered in 1963 when the California
Supreme Court detached itself from the confusion surrounding con-
tractual warranty cases, and called a tort a tort. Chief Justice Traynor,
writing the opinion for the court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod-
ucts, Inc.,9 6 stated:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on
the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for de-
fects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.97
Justice Traynor expressly negated the use of the sales warranty concept
with its limitation of privity in governing the remedies of injured
consumers, unless the contractual rules also serve the purposes for
which strict liability in tort is imposed.98
91. Klein v. Duchess Sanwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 284, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
92. Prosser, supra note 90, at 1124. Holmes, Codes and the Arrangement of
the Law, 44 HAIv. L. REv. 725 (1930-31). "It is the merit of the common law that
it decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards." For example, see
Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119, 153-55 (1957).
93. 32 N.J. 358, 383, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960). See also Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966). See note
89 supra.
94. 32 N.J. at 383-84, 161 A.2d at 83-84.
95. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr.
863 (1960). See Lascher, Strict Liability In Tort For Defective Products: The Road
To and Past Vandermark, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 30 (1965).
96. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
97. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The test the court set out
to establish the manufacturer's liability rested on the plaintiff's ability to prove that
he was injured using the product in a way it was intended to be used, as a result of
a defect in design or manufacture of which he was unaware, which made the product
unsafe for its intended use. Id. at 701.
98. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
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Under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, as clarified by the
1972 amendment, retail sales of consumer goods are accompanied by
the manufacturer's implied warranty of merchantability, unless dis-
claimed.9 9 This appears to eliminate the privity requirement. Since
current California case law indicates that members of the buyer's "eco-
nomic family" have the retailer's warranty protection extended to
them, the same would appear to be true in terms of the manufacturer's
warranty. In fact, the wording of the Song-Beverly Act seems broad
enough to suggest that unless disclaimed, this warranty would extend
to any user or consumer.100 If the warranty were disclaimed as to
the buyer, the implication is that if properly done, the disclaimer would
apply to everyone, and that no warranty of merchantability would at-
tach to the goods.101
It also appears that if the consumer who purchased the goods, resold
them to another person, this would probably not be considered a re-
tail sale of consumer goods and the second buyer would have no re-
course against the manufacturer on the warranty of merchantability.
The new consumer good has in effect become a used consumer good.
This seems to be the case even if the second sale was within the dur-
ation of the original implied warranty given by the manufacturer.
For example, A, a consumer, buys a toaster with an express warranty
given in writing by the manufacturer. The implied warranty would be
for a period of a year if no duration is stated for the express war-
ranty.Y2  A sells the toaster to neighbor B after three months. Two
weeks later the toaster stops working. B does not appear to be within
the protection of the Song-Beverly Act. He could not go against A
on a warranty theory, since A did not give B an express warranty. A
is not a dealer in toasters, so no implied warranty of merchantability
would attach from A to B. B would have difficulty proving that he
had relied on A's skill and judgment to furnish a suitable toaster for his
purposes, thus it is doubtful that an implied warranty of fitness for
purpose would arise. A cannot sue the manufacturer or retailer be-
cause it was not his toaster that was damaged. B cannot sue the man-
ufacturer because the manufacturer only warranted the new toaster at
the first retail sale, and not when it was sold a second time. If the
99. CAL. Civ. CoDE §1792.
100. "unless disclaimed . . . every sale . . . of consumer goods .... " CAL.
CIV. CODE §1792.
101. The Song-Beverly Act does not define "retail sale." However, it does de-
fine retail buyer as "any individual who buys consumer goods from a person engaged
in the business of manufacturing, distributing or selling such goods at retail." CAL.
CIV. CODE §1791(b). A retail seller is one who is in the business of selling consumer
goods to retail buyers. CAL. CIV. CODE §1791(e).
102. See text accompanying note 85, supra.
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toaster exploded because of a defect in manufacture causing personal
injury (as opposed to mere economic loss) B would have an action
against the manufacturer based on strict liability in tort, but that doctrine
does not apply to a product which does not work properly.
The Song-Beverly Act as amended in 1972 gives the consumer a
possibility of recovering against a manufacturer, as well as against a re-
tailer, on the theory of an implied warranty of fitness for a buyer's
particular purpose. 10 3 The original section treated the retailer's or dis-
tributor's implied warranty of fitness for purpose, if applicable, as a
substitute for the manufacturer's warranty of fitness.0 4 This change is
beneficial to the consumer in that he has more parties to look to for re-
covery should the warranty be breached. The manufacturer, re-
tailer and distributor must still have reason to know the buyer's partic-
ular purpose, and the buyer must rely on all three parties in order for
all of them to be liable to the buyer on the implied warranty of fit-
ness of purpose. If the buyer relied on only one of the parties, or only
that party was deemed to have the requisite knowledge, then only that
party would be liable to the buyer.10 5
C. The Duty to Service Goods Under an Express Warranty
To the consumer, a warranty usually means that the manufacturer
will stand behind his product and make whatever repairs are necessary
within a stated period of time. 0 6 This is not always true. It is often
very difficult for the layman to understand what is or is not covered
by a warranty. Warranties are also frequently vague as to whom the
consumer is to look to for repairs and as to the length of time in
which the vendor must make the repairs. Furthermore, warranties are
of questionable value if the consumer has to send an item across
the country or even across several states.10 7
Under the Song-Beverly Act, the manufacturer, distributor or retailer
who makes an express warranty must use readily understandable lan-
guage and clearly identify himself as the party making the warranty. 08
The Act places a duty on manufacturers who give express warranties on
103. CAL. Civ. CODE §§1792.1, 1792.2.
104. Former CAL. CIrv. CODE §1792.2, amended, CAL. STATS. 1971 c. 1523 at 3001.
The change, although beneficial, may not have much significance as manufacturers
usually do not have the association with retail buyers to know of their particular
purpose. Thornton, supra note 73, at 351. However, this is not the case where the
particular purpose is the same as the ordinary purpose for which the goods are
normally used.
105. CAL. COMM. CODE §2315; CAL. Crv. CODE §§1792.1, 1792.2.
106. COuNciL OF STATE GovRNMnmrs, supra note 2, at 11.
107. Id. at 11, 12. CoNsUMER RPoRTs, BUYING GumE IssuE (Dec. 1971) at 386.
108. CAL. Civ. CODE §1793.1(a).
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consumer goods sold in California to maintain sufficient service facili-
ties in this State to carry out the terms of the express warranties. The
alternative is that the manufacturer must pay any retailer in the State
who does his service for him a reasonable handling charge for replacing
the goods or making refunds, or must give him a reasonable profit if the
goods are repaired.10 9 In addition the manufacturer, distributor, or re-
tailer making the express warranties and maintaining service facilities
in the State must provide the buyers with the names and addresses of
such facilities. 110
The buyer has a duty to deliver the goods to the manufacturer's
service facility, unless-because of size, weight, method of attach-
ment or installation, or the nature of the defect-this is unreasonable.
If it is unreasonable for the buyer to return the goods, written no-
tice to the manufacturer will constitute the return and the manufacturer
then has the option of servicing the item at the buyer's residence, or
providing for its transportation to the service facility, all at the man-
ufacturer's expense. In either case, whether the buyer delivers the
goods to the manufacturer's service facility, or if the manufacturer has
to make the arrangements, the manufacturer has the obligation to pay
for delivery back to the buyer."'
The goods must be serviced or repaired to conform to the express
warranties within 30 days, unless there is a delay beyond the control
of the manufacturer or his representative, or unless the buyer agrees
in writing to the contrary." 2  If the goods cannot be serviced or re-
paired to conform to the express warranties, the manufacturer must
either replace the goods or reimburse the buyer for the purchase price.
The amount of such reimbursement will depend upon the amount of
use attributed to the buyer before discovery of the defect.1 ' The
Act makes the same kind of provisions applicable to retail sellers who
give effect to the manufacturer's warranties when the manufacturer
does not maintain the service and repair facilities within the State. 1 4
These provisions apply only when written express warranties are given
109. CAL. CiV. CODE §1793.2(a).
110. CAL. CiV. CODE §1793.1(b).
111. CAL. CIrv. CODE §1793.2(c).
112. CAL. Civ. CODE §1793.2(b). Before this section was amended, the goods had
to be returned in merchantable condition. Now, they only have to conform to the
applicable express warranties. This section suggests that even though the implied
warranty of merchantability must be present when the express warranty is given (CAL.
CIV. CODE §1793), none of the duties which are incumbent upon the manufacturer
giving express warranties apply to implied warranties. This seems to be borne out by the
fact that the word "express" was added, making the words "do not comply with the
applicable warranties" read "do not conform with the applicable express war-
ranties .... "
113. CAL. Civ. CODE §1793.2(d).
114. CAL. Civ. CODE §1793.3.
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with consumer goods." 5  However, when consumables and soft goods,
(which were specifically excluded from the Act's definition of con-
sumer goods), are accompanied by an express warranty, the buyer may
return the goods within 30 days of purchase or the period specified in
the warranty, whichever is greater. The manufacturer or retailer
must replace the nonconforming goods or reimburse the buyer for his
purchase price.1" 6
Since neither the U.C.C. nor case law covered situations in which con-
sumers had to send their goods across the country to be repaired, or
provided a definite time period within which manufacturers had to
repair the goods, 1 7 the Song-Beverly Act, in this regard, is a signifi-
cant step toward solving consumer service problems in California.
Some difficulties remain, however. The Song-Beverly Act does not
specify what facts go beyond the control of the retailer or manu-
facturer which would extend the 30 day period for servicing; it could
be anything from a strike to a "busy season." Interpreted broadly, the
section could be rendered meaningless. In addition the 30 day pro-
vision may be waived; the only requirement is that it must be a written
waiver. It could be waived at the time of the sale, perhaps in the
written contract itself.1 8  It is possible that the language of waiver
that the buyer signs might give him very little indication of what he is
waiving.
D. Used Goods
The California Commercial Code alludes to used goods in a Com-
ment stating:
A contract for the sale of second-hand goods, however, involves
only such obligation as is appropriate to such goods for that is their
contract description."19
In other words, they had to be merchantable as second-hand goods,
but the seller's obligation is a question of fact. 20  Used goods could
also be the subject of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose under the California Commercial Code, if the requirements
were fulfilled.' 2 ' Strict liability in tort recognizes no real distinction
between "new" and "used" goods. 2'
115. CAL. CIv. CODE §§1793.1, 1793.2.
116. CAL. Civ. CODE §1793.35.
117. Murray, The Consumer and the Code: A Cross-Sectional View, 23 U. MTAMI
L. REV. 11, 28-29 (1968).
118. CAL. Clv. CODE §1793.2(b); See also Thornton, supra note 73, at 351.
119. CAL. COMm. CODE §2314, COmment 3.
120. Id. This is the implication from the Comment.
121. CAL. COMm. CODE §2315.
122. Lascher, supra note 95, at 58.
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The Song-Beverly Act as amended, however, adds a new note to
consumer protection in the area of used goods. The obligations of re-
tail sellers and distributors giving express warranties on the used goods
are the same as those imposed on manufacturers of new goods under
the Act. They too must maintain sufficient service facilities to carry
out the terms of their express warranties. 2 3 However, the section cov-
ering liability of manufacturers to retail sellers when the manufac-
turer does not maintain service facilities in the State does not apply to
used consumer goods.' 24  The duration on the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for purpose, when there is an express warran-
ty given, is coextensive with the express warranty if reasonable, but not
less than 30 days or more than three months. If no duration is placed
on the express warranty, the implied warranties have a duration of three
months.
125
E. Breach of Warranty
According to the California Commercial Code, when there is a breach
of the contractual warranty, the buyer must give notice to the seller
within a reasonable time, or be barred from any remedy.120 This
does not seem to apply to parties other than the buyer, but remote
parties may be required to give reasonable notice to the seller under
the general Code obligation of good faith. -7
This requirement does not seem to be excluded under the Song-Bev-
erly Act, as the actions for damages are pursuant to the Commercial
Code, with exceptions not involving the notice requirement.128  Un-
der the theory of strict liability in tort, the duty to give notice is elimi-
nated. 29 This difference does not seem overly significant as the Code
has been construed very liberally with regard to what constitutes "rea-"
sonable notice."'"30
In terms of damages, the Song-Beverly Act adds to the Commer-
cial Code. The Code provides that damages for breach of warranty
are the difference between the value of the goods as accepted and the
value they would have had if the goods had been as warranted. 131
123. CAL. Civ. CODE §1795.5(a).
124. CAL. Crv. CoDE §1795.5(b).
125. CAL. CIV. CODE §1795.5(c).
126. CAL. COmm. CODE §2607(3).
127. CAL. COMm. CODE §2607, U.C.C. §2-607.
128. CAL. CIV. CODE §1791.1(d).
129. Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Commentary on lursprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication
Barriers, 17 WEs. RES. L. REV. 5, 7 (1965).
130. Id. at 29.
131. CAL. Comm. CODE §2714.
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Incidental and consequential damages may also be recovered. 3 ' The
Song-Beverly Act differentiates between express and implied warran-
ties, while the Commercial Code does not so differentiate. The Song-
Beverly Act provides that damages for willful breach of any warranty
may result in a judgment for treble damages, 133 but not when judg-
ment is based solely on breach of one of the implied warranties. 34
In addition, in all actions for breach of warranty, express or im-
plied, reasonable attorney fees may be awarded.'35
Both the California Commercial Code and the Song-Beverly Act per-
mit the limitation of remedies. The Song-Beverly Act's remedies are set
forth as replacement, repair or reimbursement. This appears to al-
low the parties to modify or limit the incidental and/or consequen-
tial damages.'30 The Commercial Code also allows damages to be
limited to return of the goods and repayment of the price, or to repair
and replacement of the goods or parts; this is optional unless expressly
agreed to be the sole remedy.' 37  However, the California Commercial
Code also provides that consequential damages may be limited or ex-
cluded unless the limitation is unconscionable, and any such limitation
for personal injury to a consumer is presumed unconscionable, unless
proved otherwise. 13  Since the question of personal injury is also dealt
with by strict liability in tort, where the remedies are not limited, this
provision is not as significant to the consumer as it might appear.'3 9
F. Defenses to the Breach of Warranty
Along with the defense of lack of notice mentioned earlier,140 most
defenses center around the buyer's conduct in dealing with the prod-
uct.' 4 ' This goes to the issue of whether or not the injuries claimed
resulted from the breach of warranty or from the buyer's actions. What
the warranty covered, what the buyer should have known, or situa-
tions of what is called "abnormal use" of the product are defenses
132. CAL. CoM. CODE §§2714(3), 2715.
133. CAL. Civ. CODE §1794(a).
134. CAL. Civ. CODE §1794.2(b).
135. CAL. Civ. CODE §1794(b).
136. CAL. Civ. CoDE §1793 et seq. See also Thornton, supra note 73, at 354, 355.
137. CAL. Comm. CODE §2719(1),(2).
138. CAL. COMm. CODE §2719(3). This is true even though the general un-
conscionability section of the Uniform Commercial Code, §2-302, was not adopted in
California. The California version, §2719, is only a semantic change from the
Uniform Code, which provides for prima facie unconscionability where there is a
limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods, but not where the loss is commercial. U.C.C. §2-719(3).
139. Bigham, Presumptions, Burden of Proof and the Uniform Commercial Code,
2 U.C.C. LJ. 346, 359 (1970).
140. See text accompanying notes 131-135, supra.
141. See generally, Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manu-
facturer's Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627 (1968).
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raised by the seller to show that the warranty did not cover the par-
ticular product in the manner in which the buyer used it. Thus, the
seller is not responsible for whatever damage resulted."'12  This has
sometimes been called contributory negligence even when dealing with
a breach of warranty action. 14 3
The Song-Beverly Act specifically provides that defects in con-
sumer goods caused by the unauthorized or unreasonable use of the
goods following the sale are not covered by the Act.144  The rules for
both negligence and strict liability in tort do not differ on this point. The
seller of the product is not liable when the consumer makes abnormal
use of it.145
The standard defense of lack of privity which is usually claimed
by a remote manufacturer is not available under the Song-Beverly
Act1 48 or in strict liability in tort for personal injuries. 147  It is appli-
cable, however, if one attempts to maintain an action in strict liability
in tort for economic loss. 1 48
The seller's response to the implications of warranty has been the
disclaimer. 149  The disclaimer is a statement of refusal of the seller to
warrant the goods. Historically, it has been upheld in the name of
freedom of contract. 5 Some courts have tried to construe the dis-
claimer as narrowly as possible in order to protect the consumer.' 51
Prior to the U.C.C. sellers could disclaim express or implied war-
ranties. The Uniform Sales Act provided for the exclusion of war-
ranties either by express agreement or by usage' and California
case law followed this lead. 5 Disclaimers took the form of an "as is"
or "with all faults" sale, which was held to disclaim all warranties.1 4
142. See Morrissey, Warranty in the 1970's, 5 FoRum 229, 232 (1970).
143. Id. at 232. Note, The Role of Contributory Negligence in Warranty Actions,
36 So. CAL. L. REv. 490 (1963).
144. CAL. Civ. CODE §1794.3.
145. Prosser, supra note 94, at 824.
146. Thornton, supra note 73, at 332.147. Comment, Products Liability-Expansion of Fraud, Negligence and Strict Tort
Liability, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1350, 1383 (1966).
148. See text accompanying note 192 infra.
149. Comment, Limitations on Freedom to Modify Contract Remedies, 72 YALE
L. J. 723, 725 (1963).
150. Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the Automobile Industry: Much Ado
About Nothing, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 83, 96.
151. Hollander, Consumer Prespective and Consumer Sales Under the UniformCommercial Code, 21 N.Y.U. INT.A. L. Rnv. 241, 242-43 (1966).
152. Comment, Restricting Disclaimer of the Warranty of Merchantability inConsumer Sales: Proposed Alternatives to the UCC, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 895, 899(1971).
153. Miller v. Germain Seed & Plant Co., 193 Cal. 62, 222 P. 817 (1924). See
also, Note, Sales: Implied Warranties: Effect of Usage in Implied Warranty of Quality,
12 CA~ns. L. REv. 523 (1924).
154. Comment, supra note 152 at 899. It should be noted that the Uniform Sales
Act did not contain a provision comparable to the Code which allows for the limitation
202
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Under the California Commercial Code, however, words tending to
create an express warranty, and words tending to negate an express
warranty found in the same sale, are construed to be consistent if
it is reasonable to do so. If unreasonable, the negation has no effect.
This section is subject to the Code's parol evidence rules.155 The
problems generally arise when oral express warranties are given, and
the written contract states that there are no warranties, express or im-
plied.15 The parol evidence section of the Code provides that terms of
a writing intended as a final expression of the parties' agreement may
not be contradicted by evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral
agreements. 157 A writing disclaiming warranties after the transaction
has been closed, has been held not to be a final expression of the
agreement of the parties.' 58  In other areas California has a very liberal
parol evidence rule, 59 but the section of the California Commercial
Code relating disclaimers of express warranties with the parol evi-
dence rules is not helpful to consumers who rely on oral warranties. 60
The Song-Beverly Act does not help in this area as it does not recognize
oral warranties.'" Since express written warranties are very difficult
to disclaim under the California Commercial Code, the Song-Beverly
Act does not significantly change the law."'
The California Commercial Code provides for the disclaimer of
implied warranties in Section 2316. The disclaimer of merchant-
ability must mention merchantability, and when there is a writing, the
disclaimer must be conspicuous. To exclude or modify the implied
warranty of fitness, there must be a writing, and the exclusion must
be conspicuous. 6 3 Both of the implied warranties are also excluded
by use of words like "as is," "with all faults" or other expressions which
are commonly understood to call the buyer's attention to the fact that
of remedies. See Boyd, Representing Consumers-The Uniform Commercial Code
and Beyond, 9 ARiz. L. REv. 372, 379 (1968).
155. CA.. COMM. CODE §2316(1).
156. This is usually known as a merger clause.
157. CAL. Comm. CODE §2202. The terms may be explained by course of dealing,
usage of trade, or evidence of consistent additional terms.
158. Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 102, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609, 616
(1966). See also, Shanker and Abel, Consumer Protection Under Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 29 Omo ST. LI. 689, 693-95 (1968).
159. The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence in California is not whether the
contract appears plain on its face, but whether the extrinsic evidence is relevant to
prove a meaning to which the language of the writing is reasonably susceptible. See
Stewart Title Co. v. Herbert, 6 Cal. App. 3d 957, 85 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1970).
160. Comment, supra note 14, at 347-49. This is especially true with regard to
the low-income consumer who is usually poorly educated. See Hester, Deceptive
Sales Practices and Form Contracts-Does the Consumer Have a Private Remedy?
1968 DuKE .IU. 831.
161. CAL. Civ. CODE §1791.2(a)(1).
162. CAL. COMM. CODE §2316(1).
163. CAL. COMM. CODE §2316(2).
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there are 'no implied warranties.1 6 4  If the buyer has examined the
goods before entering into the contract, or has refused to make an ex-
amination, there is no implied warranty against defects which should
have been revealed to him in the course of the examination.'6
The theory is that as long as the seller notifies the buyer, and the
buyer theoretically agrees, the seller can disclaim all of the implied
warranties.' 6 The difficulty here, however, is at least partially in the
word, "merchantability"-the disclaimer must use the "magic word" it-
self, the technical meaning of which is not understood by many con-
sumers.167  Most commentators argue that the consumer exercises
little freedom of choice because he is unaware of the disclaimer or be-
cause he sees it but d6es not know what it means.168  The Song-Beverly
Act makes an important change by providing that manufacturers, dis-
tributors, or retailers may limit, modify, or disclaim implied warranties
only so long as there is no express warranty given.169
The changes produced by the Song-Beverly Act'70 become more sig-
nificant in light of its definition of "manufacturer" as one who manufac-
tures, assembles or produces consumer goods.' 7  This broad defini-
tion could mean that the manufacturer is liable to the consumer for
the finished product, including the component parts which he buys from
others.'17  For example, if General Motors gave an express warranty
on a car, the consumer could look to G.M. if a tire was defective. The
tire would have G.M.'s implied warranty of merchantability attaching
to it because of the express warranty given on the car. One author sug-
gests that this warranty could not be disclaimed, as a manufacturer could
not give an express warranty as to one part of the goods and exclude
warranties as to the other parts. 1'7 Disclaimers under the Song-Bev-
erly Act must be made in a specific manner; a procedure which appears
164. CAL. COMM. CODE §2316(3)(a).
165. CAL. Comm. CODE §2316(3)(b).
166. Comment, supra note 14, at 349.
167. Shanker, supra note 129, at 41.
168. Whitford, supra note 150 at 97-98. Prof. Whitford argues also that the dis-
claimer is not significant, either in settling cases, Id. at 102, or in deciding what remedy
to pursue-warranty, negligence or strict liability, Id. at 106-07. He seems to be in a
minority position among the textwriters.
169. Compare CAL. Civ. CODE §1793 with CAL. COMM. CODE §2316 (permitting
disclaimers of implied warranties when an express warranty is given) and CAL.
Cobi. CODE §2317 (providing that if an express warranty displaces an implied war-
ranty of merchantability, the implied warranty may be disclaimed under §2316).
170. Id.
171. CAL. Cv. CODE §1791(c).
172. See Thornton, supra note 73, at 333. The Song-Beverly Act does not, how-
ever, apply to equipment or component parts of systems designed to heat, cool or
otherwise air condition where the system becomes a fixed part of a structure, unless
the retailer gives an express warranty with regard to the component. CAL. CIV. CODE
§1795.1.
173. Thornton, supra note 73 at 333.
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to give the buyer more notice as to what is being disclaimed than is
given under the California Commercial Code.174  This procedure re-
quires that a conspicuous writing be attached to the goods, which clearly
informs the buyer in plain language of each of the following:
(1) The goods are being sold on an "as is" or "with all faults" basis.
(2) The entire risk as to the quality and performance of the goods
is with the buyer.
(3) Should the goods prove defective following their purchase,
the buyer and not the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer assumes
the entire cost of all necessary servicing or repair. 75
A basic policy issue often raised is whether a disclaimer should be
permitted at all. The Model Consumer Act says no, and many com-
mentators agree. 76 Under the doctrine of strict liability in tort, the
manufacturer is the one who put the product on the market and who
should have the responsibility for it; no disclaimers are recognized.Y77
The Song-Beverly Act and Strict Liability in Tort
The underlying public policy surrounding strict liability in tort is
that the manufacturer is the one who marketed the product which
created the risk of harm, and he is best able to distribute the resulting
losses by charging higher prices for his products.7 " This policy rec-
ognizes the effects of the mass production and distribution system on
the consumer, and to some degree equalizes the position of the con-
sumer, in relation to corporate power.' 79
Although the plaintiff must still prove defect and causation, strict
liability in tort is not limited by contract warranty exclusions or other
statutory means by which a seller can limit his liability,8 0 nor is the
buyer required to give notice to avoid a bar to recovery.' 8 ' California
cases have extended the doctrine of strict liability to bystanders who
have neither purchased nor used the product, but were injured by it.182
174. Thompson, Sept. 30, 1971.
175. CAL. Crv. CODE §1792.4(a).
176. NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT, A MODEL ACT FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION, pre-
pared by the NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL, Jan.
1970, §3.302. Shanker, supra note 129, at 44, suggests that there should be no dis-
claimers in the consumer goods area, as does the Commentator supra note 152, at 905.
177. See text accompanying note 178, infra.
178. Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence and Strict
Tort Liability, 64 MICH. L REv. 1329, 1333 (1966). Keeton, Products Liability-
Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MicH. L. Rnv. 1329, 1333 (1966).
179. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1086
(1965). The improper or undirected use of massive corporate power-both economic
and technological-is the prime cause of unsafe and ineffective products. Turner,
Corporate Responsibility and Products Safety, 8 SAN DIEGO L Rnv. 15, 21 (1970).
180. Shanker, supra note 129, at 27.
181. CAL. COMm. CODE §2607(3)(a).
182. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75
Cal. Rptr. 652, 657 (1969); Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062,
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The California courts have held the manufacturer strictly liable in tort
even if there was a defective component or condition traced to others
in the chain of distribution,183 and have extended the doctrine to the
wholesaler"8 and retailer as well.185
In strict liability cases, recovery has been allowed for personal in-
jury and physical injury to property.'86 Whether or not strict liability
permits recovery where there is mere economic loss is still in doubt.
Two opposing views appear. In the case of Santor v. A. & M. Kara-
gheusian, Inc.18 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court held a carpet manu-
facturer liable to a consumer for the difference between the value of a
defectively manufactured carpet and the purchase price paid. The
considerations were held to be the same as in the personal injury
cases: the consumer does not have the knowledge or opportunity to
discover the defect, and when the manufacturer places the goods on
the market, he becomes strictly liable in tort having undertaken an ab-
solute obligation not only that they are safe, but that they are suitable
for the intended use of the consumer. 88
Shortly thereafter, the California Supreme Court rejected the ex-
tension of strict liability embodied in Santor when Chief Justice
Traynor, in a significant statement of dictum, said that strict liability
in tort could not be used for recovery of economic loss.180 The
Court distinguished the risk-spreading rationale of Greenman as being
designed to cover physical injuries to person or property, but not to
1072, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970); Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App.
2d 331, 338, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1969).
183. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal, 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964). California has adopted the standard of strict liability as promulgated in
the Restatement of Torts and recognized the requirement that the product must be
expected to, and ultimately does reach the consumer without a substantial change in
its condition. This could avoid liability on the part of the manufacturer, or the maker
of component parts if the condition of the item was substantially changed. See Pike
V. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 475, 467 P.2d 229, 236, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 636(1970).
184. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552(1965).
185. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 583, 451 P.2d 84, 87, 75Cal. Rptr. 652, 655 (1969). Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263,
391 P.2d 168, 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964).
186. Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 CoLUM. L. REV.
917, 924, (1966). This note defines economic harm as damages for inadequate value,
costs of repair and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of profits-
without any claim of personal injury or damage to other property. Id. at 918.
187. 44 N.J. 52,207 A.2d 305, 16 A.L.R.3d 670 (1965).
188. We perceive no sound reason why the implication of reasonable fitness
should be attached to the transaction and be actionable against the manu-facturer where the defectively made product has caused personal injury, and
not actionable when inadequate manufacture has put a worthless article in
the hands of an innocent purchaser who has paid the required price for it.
Id. 44 N.J. at 56, 207 A.2d at 309.
189. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17(1965).
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undermine the sales warranties governing the economic relationship be-
tween the supplier and the consumer.'90 Chief Justice Traynor said
that Santor was decided correctly because there was a warranty given
to the consumer, but it was inappropriate to base the opinion on strict
liability in tort, without regard to what representations of quality
were made by the manufacturer.' 9 ' Justice Peters, in a concurring and
dissenting opinion, stated that the strict liability theory should apply to
economic loss, as it might result in the same kind of "overwhelming mis-
fortune" that Greenman was designed to prevent in physical injury cases.
He suggested that sales warranties should still govern "commercial" trans-
actions, but that the "ordinary consumers" (the term needs judicial defi-
nition) should be allowed to recover under the strict liability theory. De-
fective products in terms of tort theory would be equatable to the mer-
chantability concept of the Uniform Commercial Code, so that there
would not be an unlimited spectrum of possible damages awaiting the
manufacturer. Oa
The current California law then, as set forth in Seely v. White Mo-
tor Co. puts physical harm to person or property in the law of tort, and
commercial or economic losses in the law of sales warranties. This
view, according to one author, appears to be the majority view for the
United States, 9 2 despite the obvious fact that greater consumer pro-
tection would result from putting into effect the Peters' opinion, or
the decision in Santor. This is because consumers are not usually con-
cerned with loss of profits, but they are vitally interested in the cost of
repairing or replacing defective products, even where such items do
not cause physical harm. In these types of cases, the warranty provi-
sions of the California Commercial Code or the Song-Beverly Act must
be used for recovery.19 3
The Song-Beverly Act and Federal Law
On November 8, 1971, the Magnuson-Moss Act was passed by the
190. Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21. See notes 96-98 supra and
accompanying text for discussion of Greenman.
191. Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
191a. Id. at 19-29, 403 P.2d at 152-158, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24-30.
192. McNulty, Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: The Third
Party Beneficiary of Warranties is Alive and Well and Living in Illinois, 51 CH. BAR.
REC. 339, 343-44 (1970). See also Note, Products Liability-Recovery for Economic
Loss, 38 U. COLO. L. Rnv. 426, 427 (1966); Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability
Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 976-77
(1966).
193. CAL. Comm. CODE §2318, Comment 1. Although U.C.C. §2-318 was not
adopted in California, it could be argued that since the U.C.C. sets forth only a mini-
mum number of persons that warranties extend to, and allows the cases to develop
further additions, this section of the Uniform Code is very similar to where California
case law has developed. See U.C.C. §2-318(A)-(C), and see analysis in Rapson,
Products Liability Under and Beyond the U.C.C., 2 U.C.C. L.. 315, 318, 325 (1970).
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United States Senate.194 This Act is designed to provide greater pro-
tection for consumers against deceptive practices, and to provide mini-
mum standards for consumer product warranties. 19; The minimum
standards for suppliers giving written warranties include: (1) repair-
ing or replacing any malfunctioning or defective product covered by
the warranty; (2) within a reasonable time; and (3) without charge. 190
The Song-Beverly Act appears stronger than the Federal Act for sev-
eral reasons. It requires the servicing to be done within 30 days, un-
less beyond the control of the manufacturer,197 as opposed to the
reasonable time provision of the Federal Act. The California Act pro-
vides for treble damages when an express warranty is willfully
breached,' 98 whereas the Federal Act provides only for recovery of ac-
tual and incidental damages.' 99 Both Acts have a provision for rea-
sonable attorney fees.200 The greatest single difference in the two
Acts is in the service provisions. The Song-Beverly Consumer War-
ranty Act provides for the maintenance of service facilities in Cali-
fornia where a written express warranty is given.?°1 The Federal Act
has no such geographical provision for servicing the product in
the state where it was purchased.
The Magnuson-Moss Act has not become law as of this writing. It
is clear, though, that Congress has "the power to regulate; that is, to pre-
scribe the rule by which interstate commerce is to be governed 202 under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution and therefore has the power to
pass this Act.20 3 Initially there appeared to be a clear intent by the Con-
gress to set forth uniform standards for warranties, and to pre-empt the
field in this area, 2°4 thus excluding the Song-Beverly Act from the
field. 105 To prevent this result, the Magnuson-Moss bill was amended
to provide that state laws which afford greater protection to consumers
than the Federal Act shall be exempt from its provisions, for as long
as the state continues to effectively enforce the more stringent provisions,
and as long as there is not an undue burden on interstate commerce.200
194. S. 986, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
195. Id.
196. Id. §104.
197. CAL. Crv. CODE §1793.4.
198. CAL. CIV. CODE §1794(a).
199. S. 986, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. §110(c) (1971).
200. CAL. CIV. CODE §1794(b); S. 986, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. §110(c) (1971).
201. CAL. Civ. CODE §1793.2.
202. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
203. U.S. CONST., art. I, §8, cl. 3.
204. S. 986, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. §§102-104, 109 (1971).
205. This would be done via the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2.
206. This is the Nov. 5, 1971 amendment sponsored by Senators Tunney, Cranston,
Kennedy and Harris. This amendment was patterned after the amendment to the
1973 / Consumer Warranties
The general rule for determining the validity of state statutes affecting
interstate commerce has been phrased as follows:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.207
There is a substantial state interest in consumer protection, which has
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court.20 ' The Song-
Beverly Act appears to regulate "evenhandedly," applying to everyone
doing business in California who chooses to give a written express
warranty. 20 9 The requirement of maintaining service facilities in the
state, if held to be an undue burden on interstate commmerce, could
negate at least this section of the California Act. Here, the question
is one of degree, as well as the availability of reasonable alternatives." 0
The manufacturer who chooses to give the express warranty can arrange
with local retailers to provide for the servicing, so long as they are ade-
quately compensated.2 11 This would seem to be a minor inconvenience
on the out of state manufacturer with servicing plants elsewhere. The
interest is great; the burden is minor. This provision should not be con-
sidered to be an undue burden on interstate commerce.2 2
Conclusion
Although the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is a step for-
ward in terms of consumer protection, its provisions have yet to be
tested by time and judicial interpretation. There are several areas in
which problems are readily forseeable. The idea of providing service
facilities close to where the product was purchased is undoubtedly help-
ful to the consumer. However, if he buys the product in San Fran-
cisco and the facility is in Los Angeles, it would be more helpful to him
if the manufacturer would be made to bear the shipping cost outside
Clean Air Act of 1967, which exempted California from federal pre-emption in regu-
lating emission standards, See Comment, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better
Automotive Ideas from Congress, 12 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 571, 598-99 (1971).
207. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), citing, Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).
208. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Florida Lime
and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Plumley v. Massachusetts,
155 U.S. 461, 468 (1894).
209. CAL. Civ. CODE §1793.2.
210. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
211. CAL. Crv. CODE §§1793.2(2), 1793.5.
212. See generally, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Fry
Roofing Co. v. Wood, 344 U.S. 157 (1952); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622 (1951); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
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a given radius of the purchase area. To give the manufacturer or re-
tailer 30 days within which to repair the product should lessen the de-
lay in doing warranty work. However, this will depend on how the
courts interpret what is "beyond his control" to extend that time period.
Some of the Act's provisions appear straight-forwardly beneficial.
The provision for reasonable attorney's fees not only helps the con-
sumer but might also encourage attorneys to take more cases which
previously seemed unprofitable. This same rationale applies to the tre-
ble damage provision for wilful breach of an express warranty. Tre-
ble damage recovery should also encourage the manufacturer, retailer
or distributor to complete warranty work. The area of used goods is
a relatively new one in terms of warranty protection. By placing
some of the Act's remedies at the disposal of the consumer of used
goods, he is in a far better position than he was under the Commercial
Code. The new protections given the consumer are several. One of
the most significant benefits of the Act is the elimination of any priv-
ity requirement between the manufacturer and the consumer.
Broad protection is also afforded consumers by the Act's provision
eliminating the disclaimer of implied warranties when an express war-
ranty is given. In attempting to more clearly notify the consumer when
all of the warranties are being disclaimed, the consumer should be able
to make a more intelligent decision when purchasing consumer goods.
This of course, presupposes that the buyer has a real choice, and that
all manufacturers covered by the Act do not decide to disclaim all of
the warranties.
The full impact which the Act will have on consumers is not yet
known. There has been very little publicity surrounding the Act.
Products still come with written warranties directing the buyer to ship
the goods out of state for repair. The disclaimer changes have gone into
effect, but so far there has been no reaction from consumers. Never-
theless, the Act has further subrogated the interest of the producer
to the paramount interest of the consumer and Adam Smith and
California consumers should feel some measure of deserved satisfaction.
Eileen K. Jenkins
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